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HOW IS THE RELATIONSHIP SIGNIFICANCE BROUGHT ABOUT? 
A CRITICAL REALIST APPROACH* 
 
Abstract 
The markets-as-networks theorists contend, at least tacitly, the significance of business 
relationships for the focal firm – that is, business relationships contribute somewhat to the 
focal firm’s survival and growth. We do not deny the existence of significant business 
relationships but sustain, in contrast to the consensus within the Markets-as-Networks Theory, 
that relationship significance should not be a self-evident assumption. Significance cannot be 
a taken-for-granted property of each and every one of the focal firm’s business relationships. 
We adopt explicitly a critical realist position in this conceptual paper and claim that the 
relationship significance is an event of the business world, whose causes remain yet largely 
unidentified. Where the powers and liabilities of business relationships (i.e., their functions 
and dysfunctions) are put to work, inevitably under certain contingencies (namely the 
surrounding networks and markets), effects result for the focal firm (often benefits in excess 
of sacrifices, i.e., relationship value) and as a result the relationship significance is likely to be 
brought about. In addition, the relationship significance can result from the dual influence that 
business relationships have on a great part of the structure and powers and liabilities of the 
focal firm, i.e., its nature and scope respectively. 
Keywords:  Markets-as-Networks Theory, relationship significance, business relationships, 
focal firm, resources, competences, activities 
 
* The authors appreciate the in-depth remarks of an anonymous reviewer of the 24
th IMP 
Conference (see http://imp2008.impgroup.org) to an earlier draft of this paper. All errors and 
omissions remain their own.   2
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Markets-as-Networks Theory aims to describe and explain the vertical interactions and 
relationships established and maintained between firms, namely buyers and sellers. It is the 
notorious offspring of the analytical and empirical work conducted almost over the last four 
decades by the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group, a worldwide research 
community dedicated to the study of business relationships and networks (Easton and 
Hakansson 1996; Hakansson and Snehota 2000; McLoughlin and Horan 2000a, 2002, 2000b; 
Turnbull et al. 1996; Wilkinson 2001). Though clearly not monolithic (i.e., meaning different 
things to different people), the theory features at least three major conceptual cornerstones: (i) 
the existence of business relationships (Axelsson and Easton 1992; Blois 1972; Easton and 
Araujo 1986; Ford 1980, 1978; Hakansson et al. 1979; Monthoux 1975; Turnbull and 
Cunningham 1981; Turnbull and Paliwoda 1986; Turnbull and Valla 1986), as well as their 
connectedness (Anderson et al. 1994b; Ritter 2000) and uniqueness (Hakansson and Snehota 
1995); (ii) business relationships as a third type of governance structure, alternative to both 
hierarchies and markets (Richardson 1972); and (iii) the significance of business 
relationships for the focal firm, henceforth the ‘relationship significance’
1 (Cunningham 
1980; Gadde et al. 2003; Johanson and Mattsson 1987). This conceptual paper is exclusively 
concerned with the last of these cornerstones, in particular with the identification of the 
causes eventually bringing about such relationship significance. But let us first explain what 
the relationship significance is all about. 
The notion of ‘relationship significance’ is meant here to denote ‘the influence of business 
relationships on the focal firm’s survival or growth’. That we are sticking to the meaning as 
often assumed by the markets-as-networks theorists, and not advancing a putative one, is 
supported by Hakansson and Snehota’s (1995, p. 267, emphasis added) words: “In order to 
survive and develop you have to have counterparts (…).”. Ford and Hakansson (2006a, p. 22, 
emphasis added) convey the same: “Companies can choose if and how they want to do 
something particular relative to a specific counterpart. But they cannot choose whether or not 
                                                 
1 The significance of a business relationship exists of course in relation to a particular entity, e.g., the focal firm, its supplier A or customer 
B. One needs to oppose to the more or less dominant view across the markets-as-networks theorists that relationship significance is 
considered in and of itself, that is to say, business relationships are significant per se and not for a specific entity. It seems however senseless 
to think of the relationship significance in abstract. For whenever the significance of something or of someone is presumed, a question 
immediately arises: ‘significant for whom?’. That we consider here the significance of business relationships for the focal firm, i.e., adopt the 
focal firm’s viewpoint, seems appropriate at least if it is acknowledged that “[r]elationships are (…) an important structural dimension [of the 
business network] as fundamental as organisations themselves” (Ford and Hakansson 2006b, p. 252). This viewpoint should not be equated 
with the ‘firm-centred view of the world’ or the ‘single-firm perspective’ so commonly found in Management theory, whereby the focal firm 
is presumed to be an atomistic entity solely concerned with its own objectives and interests and having complete discretion in behaviour. 
Though the Markets-as-Networks Theory usually endorses the perspective of the ‘focal business relationship’ or the ‘focal business network’ 
(Easton and Hakansson 1996), the focal firm’s viewpoint needs not be at odds with a ‘relative world’ within which interfirm interaction 
predominates.   3
to have relations with others, including their suppliers and customers.”. Blois (1998, p. 256, 
emphasis added) goes even further, by stating that “(…) it is impossible for firms not to have 
[vertical] relationships (…)”. The existence of the focal firm cannot be conceived of without 
business relationships, in contrast to what most orthodox economists postulate (e.g., 
Henderson 1932, p. 85). No existing (i.e., surviving) firm is ‘an island in a sea of arm’s-
length (market) relations’ (Hakansson and Snehota 1989; Richardson 1972). All the business 
relationships that the focal firm establishes, develops, maintains, and terminates with 
counterparts (most notably suppliers and customers) affect somewhat its functioning and 
development (Ford and McDowell 1999). The focal firm, in the event of deliberately 
terminating its established business relationships (or seeing those abruptly ended by the 
counterparts’ will), is not only somehow impeded to operate and grow, but more importantly, 
it is likely to perish. As Ford et al. (1998, p. 13) put it: “A company’s relationships are 
important assets and without them it could not operate, or even exist.”. Business relationships 
are therefore significant for the focal firm. Needless to say, the relationship significance also 
exists in relation to the counterparts with which the focal firm is connected. Suppliers and 
customers are as dependent on business relationships (for survival and growth) as the focal 
firm is. 
Given that the relationship significance is a primordial cornerstone of the Markets-as-
Networks Theory, it seems paradoxical that its causes are for the most part left unidentified. It 
is quite common to find within any theory some issues which are seen as unchallengeable and 
others, less obvious, which remain greatly unexplored. The relationship significance is bound 
to be one of the ‘currently hidden aspects of business networks’ (Alajoutsijarvi et al. 2001, p. 
104). Although the Markets-as-Networks Theory provides a ‘general picture of the 
significance of business relationships’ (Ford and Hakansson 2006b, p. 251), we claim that 
relationship significance is largely an understudied and taken-for-granted issue whose 
potential causes are not yet subject to a systematic and thorough analysis by the markets-as-
networks theorists. To our best knowledge, Wiley et al.’s (2006; 2003) empirical research on 
the ‘sources’  of relationship significance (as perceived only by suppliers) in Sweden, 
Germany, and China is a meritorious exception. 
Many markets-as-networks theorists assert and reiterate the relationship significance (see, 
e.g., Ford and Hakansson 2006b) but seldom if ever discuss it in depth. Such a discussion is 
allegedly unneeded because all research conducted by the IMP is ‘about the various ways in 
which business relationships are significant‘. Or, even more emphatically, “[t]he IMP   4
research confirmed the significance of lasting customer-supplier relationships” (Blankenburg-
Holm and Johanson 1992, p. 6, emphasis added). Such foundationalist position, for sure 
dispensable, is easy to explain. The markets-as-networks theorists take business relationships 
to be almost by definition significant for the focal firm. Their reasoning is basically the 
following: if business relationships are de facto deliberately initiated, nurtured, and sustained 
by the focal firm, then business relationships must have some usefulness (i.e., be somewhat 
significant) for that purposive entity. The markets-as-networks theorists observed and 
reported recurrently the focal firm as willingly related to and heavily dependent on several 
counterparts, inferring therefore that such business relationships ought to be significant to 
some extent for the focal firm. In sum, theorists have taken the pervasive existence of 
business relationships as a secure warrant of their significance. The taken-for-grantedness of 
relationship significance is, of course, attested by the absence of explicit debate within the 
Markets-as-Networks Theory. Yet it is made clear by Hakansson and Snehota (1995, p. 330) 
who contend that the foci of interest of the markets-as-networks theorists are ‘the important 
[vertical] relationships’ to the disfavour of ‘uninteresting and unimportant]’ ones, as if (i) 
business relationships are a priori significant for the focal firm while (ii) the purely 
transactional relations are as a rule insignificant for the focal firm. 
We do not deny the existence of significant business relationships but argue, contra the 
consensus within the Markets-as-Networks Theory, that relationship significance should not 
be considered an axiom. Significance is surely not a property of each and every one of the 
focal firm’s business relationships. The relationship significance is real but does not exist 
always and at all times – that is, business relationships need not be necessarily significant to 
some extent for the focal firm. Business relationships are not necessarily ‘islands of 
significance in a sea of ordinariness’ (cf. Ford and Hakansson 2006a, p. 11): their 
significance is liable to change  over time and they can be even on occasion burdens or 
liabilities for the focal firm (Hakansson and Snehota 1998). That the focal firm is likely to 
have but a few (highly?) significant business relationships is corroborated by the recurrent 
observation made by the markets-as-networks theorists that a limited number of suppliers and 
customers account for the majority of firms’ total purchases and sales respectively (the ‘80/20 
rule’). 
We adopt explicitly a critical realist perspective and claim that the relationship significance is 
a notorious event of the business world, taking place intermittently and ‘here and there’ – an 
event that co-exists with others (e.g., the arm’s-length or purely transactional relations   5
between firms) and is not always rightly perceived as such by the focal firm (Wiley et al. 
2006). Of course, that event’s occurrence does not depend on the existence of such a 
perception, correct or not. Each business relationship is what it is (either highly significant, 
totally insignificant, or somewhere in between) regardless of any perceptions held in that 
regard by the focal firm or any other firm.
2 Though the relationship significance is unlikely to 
be objectively identified by firms or their members, it is ‘something’ which can or cannot 
result, on account of certain yet ungrasped causes. Therefore the main objective of this paper 
is to identify, in a tentative manner, the causes (i.e., structures  and  powers) potentially 
responsible for bringing about such event. 
The paper is organised as follows. First, the Critical Realism that serves as our meta-
theoretical point of departure here is presented. Then, we offer a brief outlook of the business 
world, and its several entities and events. In particular, the underlying causes of the 
relationship significance are advanced. Lastly, we present our concluding remarks, namely the 
main theoretical implications and limitations of the paper as well as a future research agenda. 
 
2. THE META-THEORETICAL POINT OF DEPARTURE 
Scholars and researchers build necessarily upon a particular set of assumptions in their 
investigations of the world – what is commonly entitled their guiding Philosophy of Science 
or Meta-theory. Such assumptions, which every scholar and researcher should be aware of 
and make unambiguous if not explicit, concern: (i) the way the world is (i.e., ontology); (ii) 
how the world can be known (i.e., epistemology); (iii) which methods and techniques can be 
employed in its inquiry (i.e., methodology); and (iv) what causes the world to be as it is (i.e., 
aetiology). Ontology is often claimed to be the overriding meta-theoretical dimension for it is 
very likely to influence epistemology, methodology, and aetiology. The questions formulated, 
as well as the answers tentatively offered, are likely to differ on account of different meta-
                                                 
2 The focal firm holds a particular position in the network (e.g., central or peripheral), a position that results from a lengthy, costly, 
cumulative, and interdependent investment process (Mattsson 1989) and sets limits on its behaviour and enforces its rights and obligations in 
the network, both in the present and future (Henders 1992). Owing to that position, the focal firm is likely to have but a limited knowledge of 
the surrounding network in which it is deeply embedded, thus needing to make sense of that network via the network pictures it builds and 
revises over time (Ford and Redwood 2005; Henneberg et al. 2006). The focal firm is necessarily myopic, with its network horizon is more 
or less narrow. The focal firm’s more or less ‘realistic’ pictorial representations of what is within and beyond its network horizon – the part 
of the network that it is aware of and thereby can take into account (Holmen and Pedersen 2003) – contribute to: (i) the continuous upgrading 
of its network theory, i.e., perceptions, expectations, intentions, beliefs, mental models, cognitive maps, schemas, and ideologies guiding at 
large its behaviour in the network (Mattsson and Johanson 1992; Welch and Wilkinson 2002); and (ii) the reinforcement or change of its 
network identity, i.e., the views inside and outside the focal firm about its role and attractiveness for others in the network (Hakansson and 
Johanson 1988). Ford and Hakansson (2006a) include the ‘subjective interpretation’ of individuals and groups within the focal firm in their 
enumeration of the core features of interfirm interaction. Even though the focal firm’s perception does not per se make a business 
relationship significant or contrariwise, the possibility that such a perception may have repercussions on the significance of that relationship 
in the future should not be excluded altogether. For instance, the focal firm can mistakenly regard the (somewhat significant) business 
relationship with supplier A as completely insignificant and take deliberate steps to end it or not nurture it and possibly leading to its fading 
over time.   6
theoretical commitments. Likewise any criticisms to the work of scholars and researchers 
need to be made by taking their respective meta-theory into consideration. Where the meta-
theoretical commitments are unclear or remain unexamined (or worse, are ‘buried’ within 
developed or espoused theories), one often finds them at cross-purposes, talking past one 
another instead of engaging in constructive and intelligible debates. Meta-theory can hence be 
defined as what lies beyond or outside any substantive theory (Fleetwood and Ackroyd 2004a, 
2004b). The possibility of the former influencing somewhat the latter does not make the 
relation between the two tight (Sayer 2004): though having the ‘right’ meta-theory does not 
necessarily lead us to develop an unchallengeable theory, one is unlikely to arrive at a ‘right’ 
theory when starting from a ‘wrong’ meta-theory (though it can happen by pure chance). Of 
course, change is more pronounced and frequent in theories than in meta-theories. 
Whatever the field of study, each and every scholar and researcher adopts often in an implicit 
way one of three meta-theories (Fleetwood 2007a, 2005): Positivism,  Postmodernism, or 
(Critical) Realism. Positivists see the world as a closed system wherein determinism prevails 
and cause-effect relations can be empirically observed and recorded, whereas postmodernists 
argue that the world ‘lies in the eyes of the beholder’, being fully socially constructed by 
mankind via discourse or interpersonal interaction and convention. For critical realists (i) the 
world is as a whole an open system that exists regardless of any knowledge one may have of 
or develop about it and (ii) the social sciences should be critical of the social world they aim 
to tentatively describe and explain. Moreover, Critical Realism depicts the world as composed 
of a myriad of entities and events, both of which need not be confined to the realm of the 
observable. Such entities exhibit peculiar structures, i.e., sets of interrelated properties which 
make them the kind of entities they are and not anything else. In virtue of their structures, 
entities necessarily possess (though may not exercise) certain emergent powers and liabilities, 
hence being both capable of doing some things and incapable of doing others. Events result 
when the powers of entities are exercised (or, on the contrary, liabilities are impeded) under 
specific  contingencies, i.e., either particular geo-historical conditions or the presence or 
absence of other entities and the activation or obstruction of their powers and liabilities 
(Bhaskar 1975; Harré and Madden 1975). One example usually given to illustrate the critical 
realist view of the world is that of human beings. Humans, by virtue of their intricate 
physiological, anatomical, and social make-up (e.g., brains, respiratory systems, arms, legs, 
status, and so on), have the outstanding powers to think, talk, listen or run, jump, and swim – 
powers, of course, put to work always under the restriction of spatial and temporal conditions   7
(e.g., a man cannot speak fluently a foreign language without proper and lengthy instruction 
and repeated practice nor play tennis in the absence of either a court, an opponent, a racket, or 
a reasonable knowledge of the game). For incisive introductions in particular to Critical 
Realism, see Archer et al. (1998) and Danermark et al. (1997). 
The ontological, epistemological, methodological, and aetiological assumptions of these 
mutually exclusive meta-theories have been addressed exhaustively elsewhere (Bhaskar 1998, 
1986; D'Andrade 1986; e.g., Fleetwood 2001; Fleetwood 1999, 2007a, 2007b, 2004, 2005; 
Lawson 2001, 1998, 1997; Patomaki 2006; Sayer 2004, 1984, 2000; Secord 1986) and are 
summarised in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1 – The basic assumptions of positivist, postmodernist, and critical realist meta-theories 
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2.1 The suitability of a critical realist approach 
The world is usually seen as divided in two: the ‘natural’ and the ‘social’, i.e., nature and 
society. We stand with those that believe that the world predates all human beings, for it has 
existed and still exists independently of men’s knowledge or identification of it. While 
holding the realist conviction – that the world at large is what it is regardless of what humans 
choose to say, think, or write about it – one must also acknowledge the social construction of 
some parts of that world. Needless to say, as researchers we are mostly interested in the social 
world in general and the business world in particular. For surely that social world is to some 
degree  socially constructed by men via their discourse or interpersonal interaction and 
convention (e.g., theories, rules, symbols, and so forth). Contra the arguments of those 
espousing a strong social constructivist or postmodernist stance, the social world is not merely 
a tour de force of mankind or the feasible aftermath of its intents and actions. 
Since their inception in the first decades of the 20
th century, the social sciences in general and 
Management in particular have been dominated by Positivism. Fleetwood (2007a) advances 
two motives accounting for the positivist orthodoxy: (i) most of the ‘Research Methods’ 
courses attended by postgraduates in universities draw (at least implicitly) upon Positivism, 
focusing exclusively on quantitative methods and techniques; and (ii) as the courses on 
‘Philosophy of Science’ are extremely rare to find in universities, thus leaving absent the 
valuable discussion on the adequacy and shortcomings of each of the available meta-theories, 
many social scientists are unaware of the deficiencies of Positivism and that meta-theoretical 
alternatives do exist. Some social scientists however started to challenge the dominant meta-
theory, especially from the 1980s onwards. Postmodernism then arose as a fierce and 
shocking reaction to the positivist orthodoxy that claimed the world to be objectively 
available and capable of being easily known by the systematic application of the empirical 
techniques. Its development is often denoted as the ‘turn to discourse’ or the ‘linguistic turn’ 
in Science. The distinguishing feature of a postmodernist stance is its belief that the world is 
not known objectively at all and what is known is merely a tour de force of mankind, i.e., the 
outcome of the variegated intents, actions, conventions, and interactions of men. Though 
postmodernists in general claim that only two competing meta-theories are available to inform 
and guide scientific research, one needs to recognise the alternative of the (Critical) Realism. 
Positivism and Realism, despite sharing the assumption of a mind-independent world, differ 
strongly with respect to the existence of observables and unobservables within the world.   9
While realists consider both as objects of potential inquiry, positivists fail to take the 
existence of unobservables into account or merely neglect them. 
There have been over the years some social scientists whose work was rooted neither in 
positivist nor in postmodernist meta-theories. For instance, the widely known economists 
John Commons, Friedrich Hayek, Nicholas Kaldor, John Keynes, Carl Menger, George 
Shackle, Adam Smith, Joseph Schumpeter, and Thorstein Veblen, and the sociologists Karl 
Marx and Max Weber, all drew upon various forms of Realism (despite for the most part not 
using the term ‘Realism’). Realism does not represent a recent meta-theoretical reaction 
against Postmodernism (cf. Contu and Willmott 2005; Reed 2005). There is no late ‘realist 
turn’ in Science (Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2000a). Yet, it is undeniable that Realism only 
gained prominence since the mid-1970s, after its sophisticated variant known as Critical 
Realism being carefully articulated and refined by Bhaskar and others. Collier (1994) 
addresses the pivotal influence of Bhaskar on the development of Critical Realism. 
The popularity of Postmodernism notwithstanding, many scholars and researchers are now 
increasingly prone to endorse the meta-theoretical option posed by Critical Realism. Indeed, 
one can find multiple examples in the social sciences of those who adopt (mostly in an 
implicit way) a realist perspective on their research topics. By acknowledging that the world 
includes things which exist independently of any knowledge of them, a large number of 
scientists may even be called ‘minimal realists’ (Sayer 2004). For instance, the Ackroyd and 
Fleetwood’s (2000b) and Fleetwood and Ackroyd’s (2004a) edited volumes are an evidence 
of the growing number of realist inspired works across various sub-fields of Management, 
from Human Resource Management through Operations Management to Industrial Marketing 
and others. 
We adopt explicitly a critical realist approach throughout this paper. This approach seems 
suitable when one bears in mind not only the foregoing meta-theoretical assumptions of 
Critical Realism, but also our main unit of analysis, namely the business relationships as 
notorious entities of the business world. 
 
3. THE ENTITIES AND EVENTS OF THE BUSINESS WORLD 
We acknowledge that the world exists for the most part independently of what one may think, 
say, or write about it, for the world’s entities and events endure regardless of human 
knowledge or identification of them. Of course, we need also to recognise that the part of the   10
world in which we are interested – the social world in general and the business world in 
particular – is to some extent a social construction of mankind via theories, frameworks, or 
concepts (in this respect, see e.g., Blois 2003a). 
The conventional depiction of the business world is that of Neoclassical Economics whereby 
firms are portrayed as atomistic units, hence operating in markets (i.e., placing bids or 
replying to asks). Markets, naturally faceless, are the aggregates of the arm’s-length relations 
established instantly and frictionlessly among buyers and sellers. In such a stylised picture of 
the business world, there is only room for firms and their vertical transactions (and the 
markets these latter overall form). However, the business world is not like that at all. It is 
composed of firms that are interdependent units (with interconnected behaviour and 
performance), necessarily developing and sustaining multiple relations among themselves – 
see below. As Allyn Young (1928) wisely advanced, the division of labour takes place not 
only  within firms but also among them. That is to say, specialisation and ‘integration’ 
(cooperation) go hand in hand, with the former both requiring and propelling the latter (Piore 
1992). These are the two indissociable features of the division of labour, whose benefits were 
firstly pointed out by Adam Smith (1776 [1999]). Later on, George Richardson (1972) 
extended Smith’s analysis by claiming that the division of labour was not only effected 
between firms or markets. Richardson rejected the ‘distorted view’ of standard theories of the 
firm and of markets in which the governance (or management) of economic activities was 
carried out either via hierarchical direction within firms or the price mechanism operating 
spontaneously among firms. He alluded to a pervasive phenomena providing an alternative 
structure governance, in addition to the visible hand of firms and the invisible hand of 
markets: the interfirm cooperation. That (vertical) cooperation, usually ‘close, complex and 
ramified’ is clearly distinguishable from markets (and their constitutive interfirm transactions) 
wherein “(…) there is no continuing association, no give and take, but an isolated act of 
purchase and sale (…)” (Richardson 1972, p. 891).
3 
The business world is composed of multiple entities and events, not just the ones alluded to 
by neoclassical economists. Besides the usually mentioned firms and the markets in which 
they operate, the (horizontal and vertical) interfirm cooperative relations – i.e., the inter-
organisational relationships and business relationships and the networks that the latter make 
                                                 
3 Our dichotomous view of the vertical interfirm linkages including either arm’s-length relations or business relationships, i.e., either 
transactions or interactions, can be deemed by some scholars and researchers as overly simplifying. One challenging perspective is that of 
Macneil (1980) who postulates a continuum ranging from discrete to relational exchanges, arguing in favour of the likely absence of purely 
discrete transactions between firms and that the majority of exchanges fall within that continuum. That Macneil’s relational contract theory 
can be of great help in the conceptualisation of the business world is attested by, e.g., Dwyer et al. (1987) and Blois (2002).   11
up – are also prominent entities of the business world. And in addition to the oft-noted 
exchange relations of firms (i.e., their arm’s-length relations), one is bound to find the 
relationship significance as a pervasive event of the business world.
4 We address briefly in 
turn these entities and events of the business world, giving particular emphasis to both firms 
and their business relationships (and their structure and powers) while ruling the inter-




Firms are largely material entities exhibiting complex structures and therefore powers and 
liabilities. Firms include a myriad of resources and competences,
6 for the most part internally 
owned and controlled, but also externally accessed and exploited (Loasby 1998; Penrose 
1959). Plus, several degrees of authority and empowerment, hierarchical levels, 
communication channels, rites, explicit rules, tacit conventions, and so forth can be found 
within firms. Owing to such complexly interrelated constituents (especially the resources and 
competences, both internal and external), firms are potentially endowed with certain powers 
and liabilities, e.g., being able to perform activities and generate goods, services, cash-flows, 
or profits. 
Firms are surely interconnected entities, establishing, developing, sustaining, and terminating 
several types and forms of relations with one another (Young and Wilkinson 1997). 
Interestingly, almost all of the interfirm relations are themselves entities, mostly immaterial 
ones. Interfirm relations can be classified for one as horizontal or vertical. Horizontal 
interfirm relations display competition and cooperation  facets, whereas vertical interfirm 
relations include exchange and cooperation. Competition is the basic feature of horizontal 
                                                 
4 The arm’s-length relation (purely transactional relation or interfirm transaction) is a basic constituent of the market like the business 
relationship (interfirm interaction) is of the network. Whereas the firms and their business relationships and networks, and markets are all 
entities of the business world, the interfirm arm’s-length relations are mere events. 
5 The horizontal cooperative relationships that firms sometimes develop, mostly with their direct competitors but also with ‘complementors’ 
(i.e., producers of complementary products) and third parties (e.g., universities, technological centres, or trade associations) are (i) usually 
established for specific, clearly delimited purposes, (ii) formal (i.e., ruled by written, detailed, and legally enforcing contracts), and (iii) 
rather short-termed (Gulati 1998). Inter-organisational relationships can take a variety of forms, e.g., alliances, consortia, interlocking 
directorates, joint ventures, strategic networks, and trade associations (Barringer and Harrison 2000). Despite their heterogeneity, such short-
lived entities of the business world are likely to have some powers and liabilities (e.g., the ability to develop new products and the possibility 
of free-riding by the partner, respectively) on account of their structural features. This kind of interfirm cooperation, horizontal and formal, is 
less predominant in the business world than the informal and vertical one (Hakansson and Johanson 1988). For an overview of the literature 
on inter-organisational relationships, see the Organization Science 9(3), 1998 and the Strategic Management Journal 21(3), 2000. These 
entities as well as their structures and powers and liabilities (and the influence they may have on the structure and powers and liabilities of 
firms) are deliberately left out of our arguments here. This decision is accounted for by our primary focus being that of disclosing the causes 
potentially responsible for bringing about the relationship significance, an issue which (as will be seen) is not directly related to inter-
organisational relationships. 
6 Firms are competent entities, exhibiting typically a limited set of direct and indirect competences for they know both (i) how to do certain 
things and (ii) how to get certain things done by others, respectively (Loasby 1998; Nelson and Winter 1982). Each and every competence of 
firms is underpinned by tacit knowledge (i.e., know-how) possessed individually or collectively by their human resources.   12
interfirm relations and cooperation is often found in vertical ones. But that needs not be the 
case, and horizontal cooperation and vertical exchange also prevail in the business world. 
These fourfold interfirm relations are now described briefly. Firstly, firms often compete with 
one another for the ‘business’ with (common) suppliers and customers, primarily for the 
acquisition of inputs and the sale of outputs. Secondly, even competitors are likely to 
cooperate at times, commonly through formalised and short-lived relations aiming at certain, 
declared purposes (e.g., new product development). Thirdly, firms engage in purely 
transactional relations with their suppliers and customers, buying inputs and selling outputs 
only at arm’s-length distance. Fourthly, firms are often committed to lasting, informal, and 
complex relationships with some of their most important suppliers and customers. Interfirm 
relations boil down to competition, cooperation (either business relationships or inter-
organisational relationships), and exchange (i.e., arm’s-length relations). 
Given the interrelatedness of firms (mostly vertical but also horizontal), their structures and 
consequential powers and liabilities are themselves connected to each other. That is to say, the 
structure, powers, and liabilities of each and every firm affect and are affected by, to varying 
extents and in different ways, the powers and liabilities of counterparts to which it is directly 
or indirectly connected (mostly suppliers and customers but also competitors). Furthermore, 
and what seems to be a pivotal argument of this paper, the structure and powers and liabilities 
of firms are likely to be somewhat influenced (e.g., enhanced or impaired) by the structure 
and powers and liabilities of the relationships that firms establish, develop, and sustain among 
themselves – that influence being allegedly stronger in the particular case of business 
relationships. Of course, the reverse is valid: the structure and powers and liabilities of firms 
affect to different degrees the structure and powers and liabilities of interfirm relationships. 
 
3.2 Markets and arm’s-length relations 
All firms are vertically connected, upstream with suppliers and downstream with customers. 
Their vertical linkages however can differ sharply, ranging from almost instant exchanges 
undertaken across markets (the so-called arm’s-length or purely transactional relations) to 
the lasting and complex relationships (often referred to as business relationships). Firms have 
in general the option to engage in either (instantaneous) transactions or (recurring) 
interactions with each of its suppliers and customers. That is, firms either: (i) effect discrete, 
on-off transactions governed by the price mechanism, wherein price and quantity prevail at   13
large; or instead (ii) establish and develop a pattern of ongoing interactions wherein economic 
and social elements are exchanged, and mutual trust and commitment, reciprocity, and future 
interaction all matter. A firm’s decision to transact with a certain counterpart implies 
necessarily the decision of not to interact with that same entity. It is thus understandable that 
these two vertical linkages, by featuring dissimilar contents, serve different purposes. While 
the arm’s-length relations enable the acquisition or sale across markets of standardised 
resources, the business relationships allow firms to access and exploit complementary 
resources and competences of counterparts (e.g., a customer’s reputation or a supplier’s 
know-how in a field of expertise respectively). It is often the case that arm’s-length relations 
precede business relationships for only after repeated (purely economic) purchases and sales, 
firms begin to get to know each other and decide to develop a cooperative relationship that 
goes far beyond the mere interfirm exchange (Easton and Araujo 1992). Yet not always do 
firms have the option to develop business relationships because of, e.g., the counterparts’ lack 
of interest and commitment in the development of such relationships (Biong et al. 1997). 
In essence, arm’s-length relations are but fleeting (and naturally structureless and powerless) 
events that come about whenever at least two firms demonstrate the will to and agree in 
bringing to completion an exchange – a transaction that is almost instantly initiated and 
terminated. While it is more or less easy to point out the beginning and the end of an arm’s-
length relation, that task can hardly or unequivocally be done in the case of a business 
relationship. The view of interfirm transactional relations as potential events is commonly 
endorsed by economists, e.g., Marshall (1890 [1997], p. 182, emphasis added): “An exchange 
is an event (…) it is something that happens. A market is a setting within which exchange 
may take place (…).”. Yet, those same economists are prone to neglect grossly the existence 
of some prominent entities of the business world, in particular the business relationships and 
the overall networks in which firms are deeply embedded. As we claim below, such intricate 
and ongoing patterns of vertical interaction (cooperation) are entities, surely not transitory 
events. Somewhat awkwardly, economists fail to acknowledge that the markets that interfirm 
transactions form as a whole are themselves entities. Nevertheless, markets are often referred 
to by some authors as ‘institutions’ constructed, reproduced, and transformed by firms 
(Araujo 2007; Callon 1998; Loasby 2000). They comprise inter alia all the intermittent events 
constituting (taking place in) them, i.e., the set of transactional relations instantly linking 
firms. A large number of other elements which are to some extent indispensable for framing 
and governing the undertaking of interfirm transactions, such as physical spaces   14
(marketplaces), legal or contractual rules, cultural conventions, and technologies, can also be 
included as a part of markets. 
 
3.3 Networks and business relationships 
As noted earlier, business relationships go beyond the purely economic transactions between 
firms. Such vertical relationships comprise multiple interaction episodes – face-to-face or via 
telephone, fax, or email – which involve the exchange of both economic and non-economic 
elements, e.g., money and products, and trust, commitment, and knowledge respectively 
(Hakansson 1982a). By drawing upon Ford et al. (1986, p. 390) and Hakansson and Snehota 
(1995, p. 25; 2000, p. 38), business relationships can be defined as ‘(previous and current) 
patterns of interaction and interdependence between two firms, vertically connected and 
reciprocally committed to each other’. Business relationships usually denote any direct 
relationships that the focal firm initiates, develops, and maintains upstream with suppliers and 
downstream with customers. Other vertical yet indirect relationships (e.g., those between the 
focal firm and its suppliers’ suppliers or its customers’ customers) are also typified as 
business relationships. “An indirect relationship is most simply described as the relationship 
between two firms which are not directly related but which is mediated by a third firm with 
which they both have [direct] relationships.” (Easton 1992, p. 15). Understandably, indirect 
business relationships far outnumber direct ones. In contrast to the discreteness of interfirm 
transactions, business relationships are necessarily interconnected in many ways, not only 
directly or indirectly, but also positively or negatively (i.e., the interfirm interaction in one 
business relationship depends on the existence or absence of interaction in another 
relationship). The generalised connectedness of business relationships brings about co-
produced, self-organising, and adaptive macro-structures (Easton et al. 1997; Wilkinson 2006; 
Wilkinson and Young 2002), the so-called (business) networks whose evolution is beyond 
any firm’s control or intents and in which all firms seek to manage (Ford et al. 1998). 
Networks are formed and modified through multiplex interaction, thus being partly opaque 
(even to participant firms), ‘centerless’, and unbounded (Hakansson and Johanson 1993b). 
The development of any business relationship is a time-consuming, path-dependent, and 
costly process (Hakansson and Snehota 2000). Business relationships are brought about over 
time as (i) reciprocal relationship-specific investments are made, (ii) both the ‘distance’ that 
normally exists at an early phase of interaction (of a social, cultural, technological, temporal   15
or geographical basis) and the reluctance of firms to cooperate (partially related to the 
uncertainty regarding the counterpart’s intentions and future behaviour) are greatly reduced; 
and (iii) the interdependence, mutual trust and commitment, and the expectations of future 
interaction all gradually increase (Ford et al. 1986). One is prone to consider that business 
relationships always develop towards an ideal state (‘a successful marriage’) where interfirm 
conflict is totally absent, as the likes of Ford (1980) and Dwyer et al. (1987) do in traditional 
life cycle models of relationship development. Yet there is no such thing as a totally 
cooperative business relationship and some relationships may fail to develop or are eventually 
terminated, for the most part owing to persistent barriers to interaction (e.g., mismatches 
between firms in terms of organisational culture or strategy, conflicting expectations or 
behaviours of individuals) (Cunningham 1982). Business relationships evolve gradually over 
time, as firms learn to ‘dance’ with one another, both leading and following (Wilkinson and 
Young 1994). 
Both history and structure matter in business relationships (Ford et al. 1986). Current 
interfirm interaction is rooted in the past and shapes future interaction. Firms interact with an 
eye on the future of their relationship but always remembering previous interaction episodes. 
In addition, the surrounding structure of interactions (i.e., connected business relationships) 
impact upon the extant interaction amongst firms, either reinforcing or hindering it. 
 
3.3.1 The structure and powers and liabilities of business relationships 
Business relationships, on account of the above-mentioned development process, are likely to 
exhibit a peculiar and changeable nature or structure. According to Hakansson and Snehota 
(1995), their features are more or less easily perceptible and include (i) continuity, (ii) 
complexity, (iii) symmetry, and (iv) informality as well as (v) adaptations, (vi) ‘coopetition’, 
(vii) social interaction, and (viii) routinisation. That is to say, business relationships: (i) are 
long-lasting; (ii) entail a multiplex interpersonal contact pattern between firms and can be 
deployed to pursue different objectives; (iii) are symmetrical in terms of firms’ interest to 
develop and sustain them; (iv) are ruled by implicit and incomplete contracts; (v) involve 
large relationship-specific investments; (vi) display both cooperative and competitive facets; 
(vii) involve a myriad of extensive and interlinked social bonds between individuals and 
groups; and (viii) give rise to norms of mutual conduct and institutionalised rights and duties.   16
Owing at large to such an intricate structure (and to a smaller extent to their conspicuous 
connectedness), business relationships are likely to exhibit a sixfold set of powers and 
liabilities and are thus capable to produce positive and negative effects (for firms).
7 Like any 
other structured and powerful entity of the world, business relationships are ‘causally 
efficacious’ entities. They have the potential to be causal, that is, are capable of bringing 
about change anywhere in the business world, including (i) themselves, (ii) other entities (e.g., 
connected business relationships and firms), and (iii) transitory events, notably arm’s-length 
relations. 
Business relationships are established, developed, and maintained mostly because of the 
rewarding powers they perform currently (or are expected to perform in the future) and the 
actual or potential benefits that result mostly for the firms directly involved in those 
relationships but also for connected counterparts. Those benefits however can only be 
obtained by firms at the expense of some actual or potential sacrifices, in part related to the 
liabilities of business relationships – though there can be the possibility of temporary free-
riding for opportunistic firms, i.e., benefiting without suffering any sacrifice whatsoever. The 
latent, potential powers and liabilities of business relationships (and their respective benefits 
and sacrifices) can be as crucial as actual ones in the decision of firms to nurture and sustain 
their business relationships (Hakansson and Snehota 1995). 
 
Powers and liabilities 
Business relationships are bound to display six main powers, namely ‘access’, ‘control’, 
‘efficiency’, ‘innovation’, ‘stability’, and ‘networking’. That is, business relationships can 
have the power to provide firms with, respectively: (i) the access to, and exploitation of (and 
sometimes even the development of) counterparts’ complementary resources and 
competences (Araujo and Easton 1996; Easton and Araujo 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; 
Thompson 1967; Wilkinson et al. 2005); (ii) the increase of influence over or the reduction of 
dependence on counterparts, or the promotion or block of relationship or network change 
(Kutschker 1982; Lundgren 1992; Mattsson and Johanson 1992; Mouzas and Naude 2007; 
Wilkinson and Young 2005); (iii) a reduction of the production or transaction costs 
(Hakansson 1982b; Hakansson and Snehota 1995; Mouzas 2006); (iv) the identification of 
                                                 
7 In general, the markets-as-networks theorists refer to the powers and liabilities of business relationships and the effects resulting from 
exercising those powers and liabilities as functions and dysfunctions (or non-functions), and benefits and sacrifices respectively (Hakansson 
and Johanson 1993a; Walter et al. 2003; Walter and Ritter 2003; Walter et al. 2001). We stick here to the realist terminology of powers and 
liabilities, though take advantage of the ‘benefits-sacrifices’ dichotomy to address the resulting effects.   17
previously unknown characteristics of resources and competences, discovery of new ways of 
employing or new uses for extant resources and competences, or the lone or co-development 
of new resources and competences (Araujo et al. 1999; Hakansson 1989, 1987; Hakansson 
and Waluszewski 2007); (v) learning and the reduction of environmental uncertainty 
(Hakansson et al. 1999; Hakansson and Johanson 2001; Mouzas et al. 2008); and (vi) the 
management of interdependences at the actor, resource, and activity levels (Gadde et al. 2003; 
Hakansson and Ford 2002; Hakansson and Snehota 1989; Moller and Halinen 1999; Ritter 
1999). 
Business relationships are likely to display likewise six liabilities: those of failure in ‘access’, 
‘control’, ‘efficiency’, ‘innovation’, ‘stability’, and ‘networking’. Such liabilities follow 
whenever some powers are left unexercised – powers which are either expected or desired by 
firms to be put to work, at a given point in time, in a business relationship or in other, 
connected relationships. For instance, the focal firm’s business relationship with customer A 
does not activate the expected power ‘access’ or hinders the ‘control’ power in the focal 
firm’s relationship with supplier C. 
 
Benefits and sacrifices 
Relationship benefits and sacrifices need to be recognised as two sides of the same coin. The 
former are not obtained automatically, easily or for free, being partly dependent on the latter’s 
existence (Gadde and Snehota 2000). Much time and sacrifices (at the very least costs) are 
needed before relationship benefits can be harvested by firms (Araujo et al. 1999). 
Relationship benefits include all the positive effects ensuing to firms from the activation of 
any of the referred powers, e.g., the access to and exploitation of external resources and 
competences (Anderson et al. 1994b). Relationship sacrifices encompass both (i) the costs 
incurred by firms (which are indispensable to obtain benefits) and (ii) the deleterious effects 
that sometimes result from being involved in business relationships. Three relationship costs 
are usually borne by all firms (Blois 1999; Gadde and Snehota 2000): (i) opportunity costs 
(e.g., the focal firm’s relationship with customer A may preclude the obtainment of benefits in 
the business relationship with customer B or hinder the attainment of greater benefits or lower 
sacrifices in the relationship with supplier C); (ii) relationship handling costs (i.e., the costs of 
establishing, developing, maintaining, and terminating each business relationship); and (iii) 
network handling costs (i.e., overhead costs incurred with all or most of business   18
relationships). Deleterious effects include: (i) lock-in effects (e.g., the focal firm’s established 
business relationships may preclude the development of other, potential relationships) (Araujo 
and Harrison 2002); (ii) the opportunistic behaviour of counterparts (e.g., free-riding and 
hold-up problems) (Biong et al. 1997); and (iii) several other harmful consequences (e.g., the 
damaging effects of the focal firm’s business relationship with supplier A on the former’s 
reputation) (Anderson et al. 1994a; Mattsson 1989). 
 
The connectedness and potentiality of powers, liabilities, benefits and sacrifices 
Not all business relationships necessarily exhibit all the above-mentioned sixfold powers and 
liabilities. Each business relationship may be endowed with and put into practice different 
powers and liabilities over time. Of course, similar powers and liabilities (bringing about 
similar benefits and sacrifices) can be exercised in different business relationships. Also, at a 
given point in time, some powers and liabilities of one business relationship may be at work 
simultaneously, whilst others may remain dormant owing to the exercise of countervailing 
(more or equally powerful) powers and liabilities in other, connected relationships. 
Inasmuch as business relationships are connected to one another in multiple ways (directly or 
indirectly, positively or negatively), their structures and powers and liabilities, and the 
benefits and sacrifices resulting from exercising these, are also likely to be themselves 
complexly interrelated to varying extents. For instance: (i) the exercise of the ‘access’ power 
in the focal firm’s business relationship with supplier A (and the resulting effect) may – 
directly and positively – affect and be affected by the exercise of both the ‘access’ and 
‘innovation’ powers in the focal firm’s relationships with supplier B and customer C 
respectively (and the resulting effects); and (ii) the incapacity or failure to put to work the 
‘control’ power in the focal firm’s business relationship with customer D (and the non-
resulting effect) may – indirectly – affect the incapacity or failure to put to work the ‘stability’ 
power in the focal firm’s relationship with supplier E (and the non-resulting effect). The 
connectedness of business relationships has two important implications with regard to their 
powers and liabilities and consequently the ensuing benefits and sacrifices: (i) the obtainment 
of benefits and sacrifices in a business relationship can be dependent not only on the exercise 
of the respective powers and liabilities in that relationship but more importantly require the 
exercise of powers and liabilities in other, connected relationships; and (ii) the obtainment of 
benefits and sacrifices in a business relationship can impede or impair the exercise of powers   19
and liabilities in connected relationships and therefore impede or impair the obtainment of 
other benefits and sacrifices. 
Simply put, business relationships are heterogeneous entities facing diverse contingencies, 
that is to say, their powers and liabilities are put to work under (and their structure is 
potentially altered by) a myriad of different and varying surrounding conditions, namely 
connected business relationships. As a consequence, the powers and liabilities of business 
relationships do not necessarily generate the events that in general are brought about 
whenever they are put to work. When a certain power of a business relationship is exercised 
at some point, there is the possibility that its ‘usual’ effects are not brought to be (i.e., its 
‘tendency’ remains unfulfilled) on account of other, counteracting powers being at work 
simultaneously often in connected relationships. That the benefits and sacrifices of business 
relationships are often mediate (i.e., obtained in the future), interconnected, and partly 
intangible (Gadde and Snehota 2000), helps to explain why they can neither be identified by 
firms unequivocally ex ante nor are easily prone to quantification ex post.
8 
 
3.5 Relationship significance 
As contended above, in opposition to a common view within the Markets-as-Networks 
Theory, the relationship significance should not be taken as a given. We challenge here the 
presumption of the relationship significance and claim instead that relationship significance is 
a business world event and, as such, it is only potential and brought about whenever certain 
causes are at work. Those causes are the focus of the next section. 
 
4. HOW IS THE RELATIONSHIP SIGNIFICANCE BROUGHT ABOUT? 
 
4.1 The relationship benefits and sacrifices ensuing for the focal firm as a potential cause 
It seems undeniable that the relationship significance is commonly taken to be self-evident 
(see, e.g., Ford and Hakansson 2006a; Ford and Hakansson 2006b), or at the very least its 
                                                 
8 Of course, the focal firm can safeguard itself against likely changes in surrounding contingencies – what can be referred to as ‘showery 
weather’ – by drafting umbrella agreements that “(…) transform implicit norms which are embedded in customs and commercial practices 
into explicit, basic norms for interaction”, “(…) providing flexible guidance for future contractual decisions (…)” (Mouzas and Ford 2006, 
pp. 1249, 1250). Such written agreements feature “(…) re-negotiation [clauses dealing with sensitive issues, e.g., of exclusivity, 
confidentiality, or warranty] and the inclusion of extreme contextual contingencies in the form of force majeure (…)” and thus “(…) regulate 
continuing interaction between actors and translate the consequences of fulfilling or breaching exchange promises” (op. cit., pp. 1250, 1251, 
emphasis added).   20
causes are left enshrouded or not made explicit within the Markets-as-Networks Theory. We 
ought to recognise however that in case of hypothetical attempts made by the markets-as-
networks theorists to justify the relationship significance, these are likely to allude to the 
overall benefits and sacrifices resulting from the exercise of the powers and liabilities of 
business relationships. The markets-as-networks theorists (e.g., Gadde and Snehota 2000; 
Hakansson and Snehota 1995) are in general prone to claim that the relationship significance 
is brought about by either or both of two causes: (i) the relationship benefits outweigh the 
related sacrifices, i.e., relationship value is co-created and partly appropriated by the focal 
firm;
9 or (ii) the relationship benefits are greater or the relationship sacrifices are lower than 
the benefits and sacrifices (a) expected  by the focal firm (when its past experience with 
similar business relationships is taken into account) or (b) potentially stemming from 
alternatives to the business relationship in question, i.e., in substitute business relationships or 
conventional governance structures such as hierarchies and markets.
10 
We agree with the (mostly implicit) claim that the relationship derived flows of benefits and 
sacrifices, either per se or comparatively, are a potential cause bringing about the relationship 
significance. Yet this does not exhaust all the causes that can account for that notorious event 
of the business world. In our viewpoint, at least one other  cause (that remains buried, 
somewhat underlying the identified cause) can also produce the relationship significance, in 
particular the strong influence that business relationships may have on a large part of the 
structure and powers and liabilities of the focal firm or, in other words, its core  nature 
(resources and competences) and scope (activities).
11 The failure to acknowledge this cause 
by the Markets-as-Networks Theory may result from its spatial boundaries, for the main units 
                                                 
9 Relationship benefits are usually weighted against the sacrifices (mostly costs) needed to attain them. And very often, the former 
relationship outcomes exceed the latter, that is, relationship value results for firms. Relationship value can be defined as the positive, mostly 
perceived, trade-off between all the benefits and sacrifices ensuing from the involvement in a business relationship, whatever those might be 
(Anderson 1995; Wilson and Jantrania 1994). The subjectivity of relationship value is justified with the incommensurability of both 
relationship benefits and sacrifices (Blois 2004, 1999, 2003b). How is the relationship value co-produced and afterward distributed as well as 
how it can be assessed or measured by firms, remain objects of heated dissension within the Markets-as-Networks Theory and no deliberate 
attempt is made here to shed light on those matters. On the notion of relationship value, see for instance the Industrial Marketing 
Management, 30(4), 2001. 
10 In addition to (or sometimes, instead of) the effects resulting from the exercise of relationship powers and liabilities being estimated and 
compared to each other, the focal firm can contrast them with: (i) the expected effects, by bearing in mind the benefits and sacrifices brought 
about in similar business relationships in the past or potentially generated in next-best substitute relationships, referred to as the ‘comparison 
level’ and the ‘comparison level for alternatives’, i.e., CL and CLalt respectively (Anderson et al. 1994b; Thibaut and Kelley 1959); and (ii) 
the benefits and sacrifices likely to emerge in alternative governance structures, that is, if the focal firm decides to vertically integrate, or 
engage in arm’s-length relations with counterparts respectively (Zajac and Olsen 1993). The benefits and sacrifices potentially obtainable in 
alternative governance structures are exhaustively detailed elsewhere, e.g., in the Property Rights Approach (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 
and Moore 1990) and Transaction Cost Economics (Coase 1937; Williamson 1985, 1981) respectively. To our best knowledge, such benefits 
and sacrifices have only been explicitly contrasted by Phelan and Lewin (2000). 
11 Management scholars and researchers usually refer to the structure and powers of firms grosso modo as their nature and scope 
respectively, given that the distinguishing constituents of firms are resources and competences (explaining largely their heterogeneity) and on 
account of those constituents, activities are performed. The (core) nature and scope of the focal firm are here equated with its resources and 
competences, and activities respectively – with the former being the inputs indispensable to the performance of the latter.   21
of analysis therein are the ‘interaction’, the ‘relationship’, or the ‘network’ (Easton and 
Hakansson 1996). 
 
4.2 The influence of business relationships on the focal firm’s nature and scope: other, 
largely uncovered, potential cause 
We have noted above that the powers and liabilities of business relationships are sixfold, to 
wit the ‘access’, ‘control’, ‘efficiency’, ‘innovation’, ‘stability’, and ‘networking’. Although 
we do not wish to advance a hierarchy of these powers and liabilities, it seems clear that two 
of them (‘access’ and ‘innovation’) are more consequential than others in affecting the nature 
and scope of the focal firm. If it needs to be recalled, the ‘access’ and the ‘innovation’ powers 
(and liabilities) of business relationships supply the focal firm with (or impede it to obtain), 
respectively: (i) the access to and exploitation (and on occasion the development) of external, 
often complementary resources and competences and (ii) the identification of formerly 
unrecognised features of or the discovery of new ways of deploying or novel uses for the 
extant resources and competences, or the stand-alone or co-development of new resources 
and competences. The exercise of these two powers, and more importantly the effects 
resulting, shape to a considerable extent the resources and competences, and activities of the 
focal firm (both internal and external, actual and potential), that is to say, the inputs to and the 
‘things’ that the focal firm does and gets done by others at present and in the future. 
 
4.2.1 Unfolding the ‘access’ and ‘innovation’ powers and liabilities: business 
relationships’ impact upon (the inputs to and) the things that the focal firm does and 
gets done 
 
The focal firm does some things by itself 
The focal firm is a complexly structured, powerful, and interrelated entity of the business 
world. In a similar but mundane vein, we can depict the focal firm as a specialised system of 
resources and competences, confronting faceless markets and deeply embedded in intricate 
networks wherein external resources and competences are available for acquisition or sale and 
access and exploitation, respectively. The focal firm has necessarily a limited set of internal 
resources and competences, thus ‘knowing how to do only a limited number of things’ (Patel   22
and Pavitt 1997). The common decision of the focal firm to specialise in certain things (i.e., 
be competent only at some activities within a given field of expertise) for which it has some 
sort of ‘comparative advantage’ (Richardson 1972), and therefore its likely appropriation of 
specialisation gains (e.g., in the form of experience curve effects), implies that it deliberately 
relies on the specialisms of others (Young 1928). Since in general the focal firm knows how 
to do only a few things, it surely needs to ‘know how to get some things done by others’ 
(Loasby 1998; Nelson and Winter 1982) – notably those to which the focal firm is or will be 
vertically connected in some way, i.e., its current and prospective suppliers and customers. 
The focal firm’s specialisation thus requires and propels its ‘integration’ (Piore 1992), for the 
most part via cooperation but on occasion via exchange with counterparts. 
 
The focal firm gets things done by others, both via business relationships and through arm’s-
length relations 
That the focal firm owns and controls but a limited set of resources and competences within 
its boundaries, explains at large its proneness to (mostly vertical) cooperation, i.e., establish, 
develop, and sustain business relationships with suppliers and customers. The focal firm also 
has the possibility of getting some things done through exchange, i.e., by engaging in arm’s-
length relations with those same counterparts. Though the focal firm can get things done in 
either or both of ways, the business relationships and the arm’s-length relations fulfil different 
roles. The access to and exploitation (and development) of external resources and 
competences in networks is only accomplished in the former. The latter offers a very different 
route, namely the internalisation of external resources and competences (as embodied in final 
products) across markets. The highly complementary core competences of others (suppliers 
and customers especially) – what the focal firm commonly aspires to – can only be accessed 
and exploited via business relationships. The alternative of arm’s-length relations can only 
provide the focal firm with the outputs generated by counterparts via deploying their own 
resources and competences. We need of course to recognise that final products (i.e., resources 
or the external competences somehow embodied in those outputs) may be all that the focal 
firm wants on occasion, e.g., high-quality printers or premium software applications. As noted 
above (section 3.2), that the focal firm engages in arm’s-length relations with suppliers and 
customers is generally because it is unable or decides not to access and exploit the resources 
and competences of those counterparts through business relationships (probably more costly 
to develop and maintain but potentially more beneficial). Moreover, the business relationships   23
presently nurtured and sustained with suppliers and customers have often been preceded by 
the focal firm’s engagement in arm’s-length relations with them in the past. In sum, the focal 
firm gets different kinds of things done via cooperation and/or via exchange with its 
counterparts – and it is likely that the focal firm needs to diverse extents both of these kinds of 
things over time. 
For sure, the focal firm gets things done at present and in the future because of its 
participation in business relationships (current and upcoming) and, to a probably smaller 
extent, its engagement in arm’s-length relations (current and upcoming). The things that the 
focal firm gets done by others, in particular the external resources and competences that are 
subject to its access and exploitation, are inextricably tied to the business relationships it is 
able and chooses to initiate, develop, and sustain with several counterparts. More 
interestingly, the things that the focal firm does (owing to the combined deployment of its 
internal resources and competences) are in part bound to be a more or less direct reflection to 
the business relationships (and to a smaller extent, the arm’s-length relations) it is unable or, 
if capable, decides not to engage in (Araujo et al. 1999). This seems to indicate an often 
neglected issue, that the things that the focal firm does by itself and the things that it gets done 
by others are likely to be interrelated to some extent. For the focal firm does the things that (i) 
it is of course capable of doing (i.e., performs the activities for which it has the necessary 
resources and competences) and on occasion (ii) it is unable to get done elsewhere (and 
unable to persuade others to do timely or adequately). However, there are always some things 
that the focal firm is in need of and can find externally to its boundaries. In such cases, the 
focal firm chooses often to get those things done via business relationships or arm’s-length 
relations. Assume, for instance, that (i) the focal firm demands a particular set of resources 
and competences that are dissimilar and closely complementary to those it owns and controls 
internally and (ii) this set of resources and competences is externally available, i.e., housed 
within the boundaries of counterparts. Why should the focal firm internalise those resources 
and competences or instead develop them internally from scratch? There seems to be no 
advantage for those resources and competences being brought within the focal firm’s 
boundaries – or in other words, the benefits and sacrifices of employing the hierarchical or 
market governance structures are respectively lower than and greater than the ones attained in 
the  relational governance structure. The costliness of ‘acquisition’ across markets or of 
internal development needs to be taken into consideration by the focal firm (Barney 1999) and 
in many cases it exceeds the costs of the ‘access and exploitation’ via business relationships.   24
 
The influence of business relationships on the evolution of the vertical boundaries of the focal 
firm: the ‘make-or-buy-or-access’ decisions 
The dual influence of business relationships on (the inputs to and most importantly) the things 
that the focal firm does and those that it gets done is naturally implicated in the exercise of, 
and the effects resulting from, the ‘access’ and ‘innovation’ powers and liabilities alluded to 
in the beginning of this section. In this regard, the business relationships can contribute to (or 
impede): (i) the access to and exploitation (and on occasion the development) of the external, 
typically complementary competences and resources needed by the focal firm; and (ii) the 
creation of new, and the modification of the internal resources and competences of the focal 
firm (i.e., their enhancement or impairment), respectively. 
Business relationships seem to have an outstanding impact over where the (changeable and 
blurred) vertical boundaries of the focal firm are to be drawn.
12 Such an impact has been 
corroborated by the theoretical and empirical research conducted by the markets-as-networks 
theorists (Araujo et al. 2003; Mota and de Castro 2004, 2005) and other scholars and 
researchers (e.g., Barney 1999; Langlois and Robertson 1995). By keeping that impact in 
mind, the ‘make-or-buy’ decisions of the focal firm (about which resources and competences, 
and activities reside or are brought within boundaries and which ones remain outside 
boundaries) are somewhat transformed. The delimitation of the vertical boundaries of the 
focal firm cannot be reduced to a series of discrete make-or-buy decisions. Contrary to what is 
traditionally assumed (Williamson 1975), those decisions are not static, independent, and 
dichotomous. The make-or-buy decisions of the focal firm (i) are closely and dynamically 
connected to each other over time (e.g., the decision to ‘make X’ may imply the decision of 
not to ‘buy Y’ later on) and, more importantly, (ii) incorporate a third option, the ‘access’ 
(Gibbons 2001a, 2001b). Arguably, the focal firm is not always obliged to either develop or 
internalise all the external resources and competences it needs – to do the things it does or 
aims to do – since there is usually the possibility of continuity in accessing and exploiting 
                                                 
12 Vertical boundaries circumscribe the internal resources and competences, and activities of the focal firm, therefore demarcating the things 
that it does from the things that it gets done by suppliers and customers. So we can say that the focal firm’s vertical boundaries (i) delimit its 
nature and thus (ii) define at large its scope. These boundaries are prone to display two features: (i) changeability and (i) fuzziness (Araujo et 
al. 1999; Hakansson and Snehota 1989). First, vertical boundaries are changeable, being subject to expansion or contraction over time (e.g., 
in accord with the several make-or-buy-or-access decisions taken by the focal firm). Secondly, such boundaries are fuzzy owing to (i) the 
continued existence of business relationships and (ii) the significance of external resources and competences for the focal firm. Given the 
extent of interfirm cooperation, it is difficult to trace at least unequivocally ‘where the focal firm ends’ and ‘where its suppliers and 
customers begin’. And it is meaningless to draw them just by bearing in mind the ‘ownership and control’ criteria, as if only internal 
resources and competences, and activities are included within the focal firm’s boundaries. The vertical boundaries not only separate the focal 
firm from its suppliers and customers but also bring them together – they display buffer as well as bridge functions (Araujo et al. 2003; 
Thompson 1967).   25
those resources and competences (whenever they exist beyond its boundaries) via business 
relationships with suppliers and customers. The boundary decisions of the focal firm are 
hence about ‘making-or-buying-or-accessing‘, that is to say, (i) internally developing the 
resources and competences, and activities, (ii) acquiring resources and competences, and 
activities (via the engagement in arm’s-length relations with counterparts or vertically 
integrating them as a whole), or (iii) accessing and exploiting external resources and 
competences (via the development of business relationships with counterparts) respectively. It 
is noteworthy to recognise that there is an alternative to the ‘make’ or ‘buy’ conventional 
options, namely the access to and exploitation of external resources and competences 
(through business relationships), and it allows the possibility to extend (or diminish) the 
nature and scope of the focal firm while leaving unaltered its vertical boundaries. Though 
opting for ‘make’ or ‘buy’ or ‘access’ is necessarily conducive to the enlargement of the 
nature and scope of the focal firm, ‘making’ or ‘buying’ effect the expansion of the focal 
firm’s vertical boundaries while ‘accessing’ leaves those boundaries unaltered. The nature and 
scope of the focal firm are not defined once and for all by its vertical boundaries (given that 
the former two can be enlarged or reduced while the latter remain the same, e.g., via 
developing or terminating business relationships) but reflect largely the outcome of its 
multiple ‘make-or-buy-or-access’ decisions taken over time. 
In sum, we claim that a great part of the structure and powers and liabilities of the focal firm 
is likely to be influenced to a great extent by the structure and powers and liabilities of its 
business relationships. In other words, the primary components that constitute the focal firm 
and the things that it does by itself and gets done by others (i.e., its resources and 
competences, and activities respectively) are all strongly impacted upon the business 
relationships that it establishes, nurtures, and maintains with varied suppliers and customers 
over time. The conspicuous yet largely unarticulated influence of business relationships on 
the nature and scope of the focal firm over time is in itself another potential cause of the 
relationship significance – in addition to the above-mentioned cause that emphasises the 
powers and liabilities of business relationships and the respective effects resulting for the 
focal firm. 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This conceptual paper builds explicitly upon a critical realist meta-theory, therefore 
acknowledging the largely mind-independence and openness of the world, composed of a 
myriad of entities (with their own structures and powers and liabilities, all of them somehow 
interconnected) and events (likely to be brought about whenever powers and liabilities are put 
to work, inevitably under varying contingencies). Its main purpose has been to perform an 
exploration into the causes of the relationship significance, that significance being to our view 
a pervasive and yet insufficiently inquired event of the business world. 
 
5.1 Theoretical contributions 
 
The entities and events of the business world 
We have provided here a realist-inspired view of the business world, for sure a part of the 
social world we inhabit. Arguably, the business world includes a multiplicity of entities and 
events. Firms are at the forefront of those entities but they are certainly not alone. Firms are 
complexly structured and powerful entities, probably the most prominent of the entities 
existing in the business world for they are responsible for bringing into existence other 
entities (e.g., inter-organisational relationships, business relationships, networks, and markets) 
and some events (notably arm’s-length relations). Firms comprise a diversity of components, 
the most important of these being, in our perspective at least, their resources and 
competences. Owing to such intricate structures, firms are endowed with several powers and 
liabilities and thus capable of performing activities, and producing outputs, cash flows, or 
profits. Given their limitedness of resources and competences, firms are prone to embark on 
different kinds of relations among themselves, mostly via cooperation but also exchange. 
Vertical cooperation is more prevalent than horizontal cooperation, that is, business 
relationships are more frequently developed than inter-organisational relationships. Business 
relationships are entities on their own, exhibiting an intricate structure (e.g., long-lasting, 
ruled by informal contracts, entailing multiplex interpersonal contacts, and so forth) and a 
sixfold set of powers and liabilities (i.e., ‘access’, ‘control’, ‘efficiency’, ‘innovation’, 
‘stability’, and ‘networking’). Networks are entangled webs of connected business 
relationships and firms. Interfirm punctual exchanges are also commonly found to diverse 
extents in the business world. Such relations at arm’s-length distance are mere on-off events   27
of the business world, ruled by the price mechanism. Paradoxically, these fleeting events 
constitute, together with other elements which frame and govern them (e.g., technologies, 
marketplaces, contractual rules), the peculiar entities known as markets. The interrelatedness 
of firms implies that their structures and powers and liabilities are necessarily connected to 
one another. Surely, the powers and liabilities of firms are exercised under particular 
contingencies, especially the surrounding business relationships and networks. 
 
The potential causes of the relationship significance 
The relationship significance denotes the influence that business relationships have on the 
survival and growth of the focal firm (Kalwani and Narayandas 1995). Of course, the 
relationship significance can also exist in relation to other entities, e.g., the focal firm’s 
counterpart or even other firms, directly or indirectly connected to each or both of them. That 
the relationship significance necessarily exists in relation to an entity does not mean that its 
existence is dependent in some way on any (right or wrong) perceptions or knowledge held by 
that entity. The relationship significance exists even when the focal firm is totally unaware of 
it. 
The relationship significance is claimed to be a basic conceptual cornerstone of the Markets-
as-Networks Theory. In general the markets-as-networks theorists consider it almost as an 
axiom, seemingly taking in uncritical fashion the relationship significance to be a corollary of 
the ubiquitous existence of business relationships, e.g., Hakansson and Snehota (1995, pp. 
379-81). We challenge here such foundationalist position for the mere existence of business 
relationships does not mandate automatically their significance for the focal firm. Despite the 
business relationships being potentially significant for the focal firm, not all of them are so. 
Significance is certainly not a given attribute of each and every business relationship of the 
focal firm. The relationship significance is not a regularity of the business world; instead it is 
a  potential event that is brought about by certain causes and, as just stressed, endures 
regardless of any entity’s perception or knowledge of it (even that of the focal firm). Yet the 
relationship significance is more properly approached as varying (along a continuum) than a 
dichotomy, since one is able to find in the business world a diversity of business relationships, 
ranging from absolutely insignificant through lowly significant and averagely significant to 
highly significant ones.   28
Our main claims here are that the relationship significance is brought about by either or both 
of two causes: (i) the overall powers and liabilities of business relationships are put to work, 
under the mediation of connected business relationships, and more positive than negative 
effects (i.e., benefits in excess of sacrifices or relationship value) result for the focal firm or, 
alternatively, those benefits and sacrifices are respectively greater and lower than the benefits 
and sacrifices expected by the focal firm or eventually resulting from alternatives (i.e., 
substitute business relationships and/or alternative governance structures such as hierarchies 
and markets); and (ii) the exercise of the ‘access’ and ‘innovation’ powers and liabilities of 
business relationships (and the ensuing effects) impacts upon a great part of the structure and 
powers and liabilities of the focal firm, that is to say, the internal and external resources and 
competences at its disposal (nature) and the activities it performs (scope). The latter of these 
causes demands particular attention for it is in line with the common view that business 
relationships are privileged means by which the powers and liabilities of counterparts are 
made available to the focal firm for ‘access and exploitation’. The participation in business 
relationships (and the effects resulting from the exercise of their powers and liabilities, in 
particular ‘access’ and ‘innovation’ ones) can help the focal firm to alter (i) its own structure 
(e.g., modify extant resources, exploit new external competences) and as a result (ii) its 
powers and liabilities (e.g., increased efficiency in the performance of activities). 
 
5.2 Managerial implications 
Our contribution is chiefly of a conceptual kind. The indisputability of the relationship 
significance is called into question and a causal account of its potential causes is provided. 
The main objectives of this work are therefore description and explanation, not prediction. 
We intend to answer a major research question: ‘why are business relationships significant (to 
some extent) for the focal firm?’ or, in other words, ‘how is the relationship significance 
brought about?’. For sure, we do not provide definitive answers to questions such as ‘Which 
business relationships are in general significant for the focal firm? And to what extent?’ or ‘Is 
the business relationship with counterpart X highly significant for the focal firm at present? 
When is that degree of relationship significance likely to change?’. Since the causes of the 
relationship significance are tentatively advanced here, it is likely that only tentative answers 
to these questions can be given. The fallible knowledge of the causes of the relationship 
significance can nonetheless give us the ability to (i) offer tendential predictions about the 
future occurrence of the event (e.g., is it likely that the relationship significance is ever   29
brought about in the focal firm’s relationship with supplier A?) or (ii) issue normative 
guidelines if those are needed or can be issued (e.g., what needs to change in order that the 
actual degree of relationship significance in the relationship with customer B is increased?). 
That our main contributions here are theoretical does not imply that managerial implications 
are entirely absent. This paper attempts to contribute directly to a more robust knowledge 
about, and indirectly to a more effective and efficient management of the business 
relationships and networks in which the focal firm is deeply embedded. 
Given that (i) business relationships differ between themselves (and over time) in their 
relative degree of significance and (ii) the focal firm is endowed with limited resources and 
competences (and consequently, can be highly involved with only a limited number of 
counterparts), “(…) there is a need for giving certain [business] relationships priority over 
others” (Ford et al. 1998). The focal firm is thus advised to be rather selective in the 
development and maintenance of its business relationships. Different priorities should be 
attributed to, and attained in, differently significant business relationships. This means that the 
focal firm needs to effect a differentiated relationship posture (i.e., degree of involvement) in 
its business relationships (Hakansson and Snehota 1995, p. 131). The best way for the focal 
firm to ‘make the most’ of its diverse business relationships is to establish and nurture both 
low- and high-involvement relationships, committing to such relationships lesser and greater 
amounts of resources and competences respectively (Gadde and Snehota 2000). The focal 
firm is in general strongly committed to the business relationships which are (or can become) 
highly significant. A low-involvement posture, on the contrary, is likely to be adopted by the 
focal firm in its business relationships that are low in significance. The message is clear: 
business relationships should be managed in varied ways by the focal firm, in accordance 
with their (present or future) degree of relationship significance. The differentiation in the 
relationship posture, in essence the relationship and network management (Ritter et al. 2004), 
can be implemented only when the focal firm is able to (i) identify which of its business 
relationships are (or will be) significant and to what degree and (ii) more importantly 
understand  why  that is the case. Only by probing into the relationship significance and 
identifying tentatively its potential causes, can the focal firm acquire or improve its 
understanding concerning the individual and collective management of business relationships. 
Independently of the field of study, advances in knowledge go hand in hand with 
improvements in practice. “[B]y extending and improving firms’ understanding and   30
sensitivity regarding relationship and network issues, better performing firms and networks 
will emerge (…).”(Wilkinson and Young 2002, p. 127). 
 
5.3 Limitations and future research 
 
The interplay between business relationships and inter-organisational relationships 
One is certain to find among the multiple entities of the business world the inter-
organisational relationships that the focal firm develops and maintains for the most part with 
its competitors. The kind of interfirm cooperation featured in those horizontal relationships 
differs from that of vertical relationships, with the former presenting a structure and powers 
and liabilities of its own. The inter-organisational relationships are often ruled by explicit 
contracts, are short-lived, and aim at unambiguous objectives (e.g., the access and 
exploitation of the resources and competences of competitors). The horizontal and vertical 
cooperative relationships of the focal firm are necessarily interrelated to some extent: despite 
being sought for diverse motives, the inter-organisational relationships and business 
relationships compete inevitably for the limited resources and competences of the focal firm, 
in particular the resources and competences dedicated to effecting cooperation with 
counterparts. Firms are surely responsible for bringing about business relationships as well as 
inter-organisational relationships. So, the structure and powers and liabilities of business 
relationships and inter-organisational relationships are heavily influenced by the structure and 
powers of the firms responsible for their establishment, development, and maintenance. The 
commitment to consolidate the structure and thus the powers of inter-organisational 
relationships are likely conducive to the absence of commitment to strengthen the structure 
and thus the powers of business relationships, on account of the limitedness of the focal firm’s 
resources and competences. The interaction between the structure and powers and liabilities 
of both inter-organisational relationships and business relationships is not here given the 
attention it probably deserves. 
 
Relationship significance: a subject on need of further research 
The absence of empirical research and findings is a shortcoming recurrently pointed out to 
conceptual papers. Though “(…) it is clear that research is likely to involve a division of   31
labour between theorists and empirical researchers.” (Ackroyd 2004, p. 158), scholars and 
researchers are in general expected to immerse in empirical sources and gather evidences to 
corroborate or refute a postulated hypothesis or theory, via the employment of case studies, 
surveys, or any other methodological tools. They are often not urged to devise, extend, or 
improve the current state of the art of knowledge by using conceptualisation. Contrary to the 
positivist conception of Science, a pure conceptual analysis (such as ours here) is not 
absolutely sterile. It can be proficuous and help to shed light on matters of interest. As 
Tsoukas (1989, p. 558) put it, both ‘up in the clouds’ and ‘down to earth’ research efforts are 
necessary. 
This ‘up in the clouds’ paper has called into question the indisputability of the relationship 
significance and provided a tentative account of its potential causes. One of our major thrusts 
is to trigger some discussion over the (usually taken-for-granted) relationship significance and 
that the near future contemplates both conceptual and empirical research, with each feeding 
back the other. First, it is desirable that other conceptual works on the subject are carried out. 
The present work is only a starting point and we hope that it can draw enough interest in order 
to be analytically reviewed, criticised, modified, or extended (e.g., by resorting to other 
bodies of knowledge). Second, the subject seems to be ripe for empirical investigations, for 
instance, concerning (i) the heterogeneous contingencies faced by the focal firm (namely the 
intricate networks of interactions and the faceless markets of transactions in which it is deeply 
embedded and operates at arm’s-length distance, respectively) and (ii) how the potential 
causes of the relationship significance evolve, are put to work under, and interact over time 
with these changing contingencies. A diversity of more specific questions may guide such 
‘down to earth’ research endeavours: (i) ‘in what ways do the prevailing contingent 
conditions (e.g., the relationship connectedness) impact on the significance of the focal firm’s 
business relationship with customer A?’; (ii) ‘what are the dominant powers presently at work 
bringing about the significance of the business relationship with supplier B?’; (iii) ‘what 
enhances or impairs the exercise of the ‘networking’ power of the business relationship with 
supplier C?’; or (iv) ‘how do the ‘access’ and ‘control’ powers (of the business relationship 
with customer D) interact over time?’. In a nutshell, we believe that a (critical realist) spiral-
like approach to theory and evidence is as apposite here as in the Social Sciences at large 
(Sayer 2000). The analytical explanation of the world’s causes needs to be complemented 
with intensive case studies of their operation under diverse contingencies, e.g., see Pawson 
and Tilley’s (1997) realistic evaluation of public policy programmes featuring the contingent   32
effects of crime prevention procedures such as electronic surveillance on the discouragement 
or impediment of criminal behaviour). 
So far, the relationship significance can be adequately depicted as a ‘black box’ on the 
grounds that its causes are left unidentified. The markets-as-networks theorists are therefore 
urged to ‘open up’ in a tentative manner that box, by describing and explaining the structure 
and powers and liabilities potentially responsible for bringing it about. That is what we have 
attempted to do here. 
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